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Abstract
Proof of Stake (PoS) is a burgeoning Sybil resistance mechanism that aims to have a digital asset
(“token”) serve as security collateral in crypto networks. However, PoS has so far eluded a comprehensive
threat model that encompasses both Byzantine attacks from distributed systems and financial attacks
that arise from the dual usage of the token as a means of payment and a Sybil resistance mechanism.
In particular, the existence of derivatives markets makes malicious coordination among validators easier
to execute than in Proof of Work systems. We demonstrate that it is also possible for on-chain lending
smart contracts to cannibalize network security in PoS systems. When the yield provided by these
contracts is more attractive than the inflation rate provided from staking, stakers will tend to remove
their staked tokens and lend them out, thus reducing network security. In this paper, we provide a simple
stochastic model that describes how rational validators with varying risk preferences react to changes
in staking and lending returns. For a particular configuration of this model, we provide a formal proof
of a phase transition between equilibria in which tokens are predominantly staked and those in which
they are predominantly lent. We further validate this emergent adversarial behavior (e.g. reduced staked
token supply) with agent-based simulations that sample transitions under more realistic conditions. Our
results illustrate that rational, non-adversarial actors can dramatically reduce PoS network security if
block rewards are not calibrated appropriately above the expected yields of on-chain lending.
1 Introduction
There is currently an intense effort to improve the scalability of blockchains and other decentralized value
systems known as crypto networks. These networks use cryptographic proofs and game theoretic construc-
tions to provide tamper-resistant updates to a global ledger. While there are a variety of research and
engineering challenges in setting up these systems, one of the major bottlenecks to network throughput is
the cost of Sybil resistance mechanisms within a decentralized consensus protocol. Proof of Work (PoW)
networks achieve Sybil resistance by requiring consensus-participating nodes to provably burn energy to
compute many iterations of a particular cryptographic hash function. PoW, while effective and permis-
sionless, expends a large amount of natural resources and has resulted in concentrated ownership of the
underlying digital assets (e.g. Bitcoin). Proof of Stake (PoS) was first introduced as an alternative in a 2012
BitcoinTalk post [46] that showed the equivalence between a PoW miner who could immediately reinvest
her block rewards into hash power within the network and a PoS validator who can reinvest their validation
earnings into network security. PoS works by instead allowing users to ‘lock’ a digital asset, known as a
token, into a smart contract that provides them with token-denominated returns in exchange for validating
transactions and providing network security. Using shared, verifiable randomness, all network participants
can use a multi-party computation protocol to sample the distribution of asset ownership locked into the
contract and choose participant(s) who receive the block reward emitted by the network. This is analogous
to how PoW can be thought of as a protocol that samples the distribution of hash power to choose the next
block producer [42]. One of the main benefits of PoS is that one does not have to commit a costly natural
resource to participate in the network. Instead, a purely digital asset is used as collateral for the network
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and the network can control its supply to provide the desired properties. For an introductory background
on PoS protocols and their complex security models, please see [27, 28, 48, 17, 41].
In this paper, we show that these purported benefits do not come for free. As PoS algorithms inherently
connect a decentralized network’s security with the capital cost of a digital asset, PoS protocols tie their
security to the cost of capital rather than to the cost of a natural resource. Volatility in the cost of capital,
which is usually higher than that of natural resources [45], can have adverse effects on capital commitments
to PoS networks. The main result we show is that alternative sources of yield can drive staking token capital
allocators to collectively drain a network’s security, akin to a bank run. In particular, we find that PoS
in deflationary systems is unstable and unlikely to work and that for more reasonable inflation rates, the
effectiveness of PoS depends on the relationship between staking and lending rates. This relationship should
inform the further design of PoS systems, especially as a large number of networks are launching in 2020.
Transitioning Security from PoW to PoS
The move from PoW to PoS presents a plethora of challenges. In a PoS system, the network relies on
participants who are staked in the system to stay online in order to achieve liveness. In practice, this is
implemented by slashing participants — redistributing or burning a participant’s stake that is committed
for validation rewards when they perform a malicious act — who go offline or miss a block that they are
supposed to produce. Moreover, there are attacks that are unique to PoS such as the nothing-at-stake and
long-range attacks [24, 21]. These attacks are impossible in PoW, as resource costs of digital assets are
practically zero, especially when compared to costs of natural resources [9]. Lastly, as the asset used for
staking is also the medium of exchange, a malicious validator needs to only aggregate 33% of the token to
perform a Byzantine attack.1
However, if there exist physically settled futures contracts on PoS tokens, then it is possible for an attacker
to buy futures that allow for staking participants to sell their staked token in the future. This attacker
can aggregate this stake and upon reaching an attack threshold, begin to perform a double spend or other
malicious attack [14]. As these derivatives can be settled off-chain (e.g. using a centralized exchange like
BitMEX or Deribit), monitoring of this type of attack can be difficult. In PoW, one would need to aggregate
the hash power needed to produce 50% of the network’s hashrate, which is a much harder task that relies
on aggregating data centers, specialized hardware, cheap electricity, and a favorable country of residence.
Moreover, PoS systems are vulnerable to financial attacks, or attacks that utilize the fact that PoS tokes
serve as both the instrument of security and as the medium of exchange. Such attacks are often feasible due
to emergent and unexpected coordination between participants in a PoS network and an external market.
Given the vulnerability of PoS to cartel-like behavior that can be coordinated via an external market, one
might naturally ask if there are also any endogenous financial risks on PoS protocols that support smart
contracts. Recently, there has been an uptick in interest in Decentralized Finance (‘DeFi’), which uses smart
contracts to implement standard financial primitives in a purely on-chain manner [29]. These primitives,
such as exchanges [54], lending [33], and stable reserve currencies [25, 2, 36], decentralize banking functions
by creating incentives that encourage rational participants to receive arbitrage profits for maintaining the
system’s security, while also meting out financial punishments for misbehavior. Instead of explicitly pun-
ishing fraud via legal recourse, these protocols use purely financial modes of recourse to encourage network
participation and growth. One of the biggest sectors within DeFi is the on-chain lending market, in which
the largest single platform is Compound [33], an Ethereum smart contract that allows users to lend and
borrow assets that conform to the ERC-20 token standard. The Compound smart contract has held up to
$175 million of assets, has had over 40% of the float of the Dai stablecoin [36], and saw double digit asset
growth during 2019. Given that Ethereum is likely to transition to PoS soon one must evaluate: are there
any financial attacks against chain security that result from an on-chain lending system? A simple gedanken
experiment for answering this question from the view of on-chain lending might be of the form:
1The majority of Proof of Stake systems use traditional Byzantine Fault Tolerant algorithms [32, 12] once validators are
sampled, which is why they are only resistant to 33% Byzantine actors versus 50% for Nakamoto consensus
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Figure 1: Staking and lending with Compound’s smart contract parameters (left) and more aggressive
parameters with yields of up to 75%. The y-axis in both figures is the percentage of the total outstanding
token supply that is allocated to staking versus that which is allocated to lending. This simulation had 512
agents whose parameters were sampled as in equations (3) and (4). Note that the two figures have different
time-scales to illustrate how the parameters of the model (see §3.2.1) affect the oscillations between staked
and lent supply
Suppose that we assume that validators are rational financial agents. Would they not simply
move their assets between staking and on-chain lending, depending on which has a higher yield?
In particular, it is clear that there is a relationship between the price of capital availability and participant’s
willingness to stake, as stakers have to earn more than a risk-adjusted market rate on their staked capital.
However, unlike Proof of Work, there are no physical limits that prevent validators in staking networks from
rapidly moving their assets into higher yielding activities. On-chain lending, such as Compound, makes this
particularly efficient, as validators simply have to post a single Ethereum transaction to unbond their tokens
and begin earning yield within a single block time. High lending yields would likely lead to a reduction in
network security (e.g. a financial attack) as these yields would encourage rational actors to unexpectedly
coordinate and reduce network security by optimizing for financial gain.
We answer these questions with a stochastic model that can be theoretically solved in certain situations
and is easily simulated via Monte Carlo methods. Our aim is not to model realistic networks parameters
perfectly, but rather to show that even in the most simplified model of agents optimizing portfolios composed
of staked and lent tokens, on-chain lending can cause dramatic volatility in network security. In particular,
we construct an agent-based model, where each network participant is represented via an agent with a utility
and decision function. Agent-based modeling has been previously used for modeling censorship properties in
sharded PoW chains [16] and can serve as a conduit for comparing theoretical results to empirical data in a
statistically rigorous manner. Our model for rational network agents involves having each participant view
their total token wealth as a two component portfolio of tokens staked and lent. We assume that the agents
have different risk preferences and locally optimize their token portfolios using mean-variance optimization
[39], which allows for agents to adjust their portfolios based on observed returns and risk preferences. Figure 2
illustrates that there is a phase transition in inflation rate that leads to tokens going from being predominantly
lent in deflationary regimes to predominantly staked in inflationary regimes. Moreover, figure 3 shows that
the spread between borrowing and lending rates is significantly worse for deflationary PoS assets, further
confirming the existence of a phase transition. We explicitly state our simplifying assumptions in §2 and note
that agent-based modeling allows one to relax these assumptions and analyze how these results carry over
to real PoS protocols, such as Cosmos [10] and Tezos [23]. In section §4, we prove properties of this model
that match the observed phase transition from figures 2 and 5. A single sample path is depicted in Figure
1, which visually show that agents participating in on-chain lending and staking can cause a “flippening,”
where there are more assets lent out than staked. The observed volatility in the amount of assets staked
is tantamount to dramatically reducing the cost of taking over a staking network, which implies that the
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Figure 2: Plots of relative amount of staking to lending, with inflation increasing in a clockwise manner.
When these plots are negative, there is, on average, more lending than staking and vice-versa, when positive.
When we are deflationary (top two rows), we see that regardless of the lending rate parameters (the x-axis
is β0 and the y-axis is β1 from equation (1)), tokens on average lent. This empirically demonstates that
there is a phase transition from a lending-dominated regime (which is deflationary) to one that is staking-
dominated and inflationary. This simulation also uses 512 agents and the titles state the inflation rate (which
is deflationary if it is less than 1), block reward, half-life, and borrow threshold (see §5.3) and each sample
involves an average over a hundred random seeds.
Figure 3: Plots of the relative spread between borrowing and lending rates. If the value is higher, then
borrowing costs more than lending. Note that in the deflationary regime, as the lending rates increase (e.g.
as β0, β1 from (1) increase), the spread also increases, whereas this effect is far more muted. The simulation
parameters are the same as figure 2.
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security model of PoS networks needs to account for attacks on the network that stem from reduced cost
of capital. The combination of theoretical and simulation-based results demonstrate that the threat model
for PoS networks needs to be expanded to include financial attacks that result from yield competition with
on-chain financial products.
For provenance, note that the mathematical notation used in this paper is documented in Appendix A.
2 Protocol Assumptions
In order to simplify our model, we will make some simplifying assumptions. These assumptions hold for all
models analyzed in this paper and they focus on properties of the underlying distributed ledger rather than
properties about the economic behavior of participants, which is described in the proceeding section.
Assumption 1 (Cryptographic). All sampling processes use true randomness and not pseudorandomness
This differs from many standard cryptographic threat models that assume pseudorandomness and provide
an -approximation to true random sampling [30]. In the Appendix, we use this property to ensure that
our PoS algorithm is non-anticipating (e.g. adapted to a suitably chosen filtration), allowing for conditional
probabilities to be computed without having to aggregate the  error terms. One can remove this assumption,
in a similar manner to [13], with a significant increase in proof complexity.
Assumption 2 (Distributed Systems). All communication between participants is synchronous.
This can be relaxed to partial synchrony, with an increase in complexity in the proofs and simulations
described in the following section.
Assumption 3 (Identity). All pseudonymous identities are known by all participants and the number of
participants (measured by unique addresses), n, is fixed.
Assumption 4 (Time). The entire system will update at discrete time intervals, with each tick to be thought
of as a block update.
While participants will likely execute strategies in continuous time, assuming discrete time evolution ensures
that participants only respond to event updates that are received on-chain. One can also remove this
assumption at the cost of increased variance using ‘Poissonization’ techniques [26] and ‘sleepy consensus’
assumptions [43].
Assumption 5 (No External Markets). Only on-chain lending, borrowing, and staking will be considered.
We are ignoring off-chain lending (e.g. OTC desks or lending businesses, such as Galaxy and Tagomi) and are
assuming that there always exists block space for any participant’s action to succeed. We are omitting this
to reduce the complexity of our model, as off-chain lending has varied pricing models and term structures.
Assumption 6 (Money Supply is Deterministic). The block reward at time t, Rt and the money supply at
time t, St =
∑t
s=0Rt are deterministic and known to all participants.
In particular, we avoid assuming that there exist governance mechanisms for changing the block reward,
which have been proposed for protocols such as Algorand [22] and Celo [25].
Assumption 7 (No Transaction Fee Revenue). The only revenue that validators receive from staking comes
from the block reward.
This is a model assumption that removes the complexity of modeling crypto network fee markets, which
currently have unstable dynamics and are poorly understood.
Assumption 8 (PoS). The following properties hold for our idealized PoS algorithm:
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• No compounding: PoS mechanism uses epoch-based sampling and does not immediately reinvest block
rewards. This is to avoid the concentration behavior described in [19]. One can relax our model to
handle Po´lya urn processes, at the cost of significantly worse variance.
• Single validator per block: To simplify the model, we avoid using committees [22, 47, 25, 23, 10, 15,
44, 41] and verifiers [5, 6] as they add more variance and make both formal and simulation methods
more difficult.
• Constant slashing probability: We assume that each validator has a fixed probability pslash of being
slashed on a block that they produce. This is simplistic as it assumes that all validators have the same
chance of being slashed, regardless of stake and validation history. However, in practice, we have seen
very few live slashes and this model encourages simpler formal and simulation analysis.
• Sharded state is synchronously traversed Any sharded state in our PoS blockchain is read synchronously
and we assume linearizability in our blockchain. This can be relaxed to non-linearizable protocols like
Avalanche [47], but will depend on the scoring function used for each branch.
• No unbonding period We do not assume that the PoS protocol has an unbonding period like that of
Cosmos [10] or Tezos [23].
3 Model
3.1 PoS Model
Let St be the total outstanding token supply of a PoS protocol at time t and let St = ζt + `t, where ζt is the
number of staked tokens and `t is the number of lent tokens. We use a simple model of a PoS system that
samples a single block producer from a discrete time-series of stake distributions, denoted by pistake(t) ∈ ζt∆n,
where ∆n is the n-dimensional probability simplex (see Appendix A). The main input parameters are:
• pistake(0): Initial asset distribution
• Rt: Staking block reward at block height t
• S(i, pistake): Slash that validator i receives if the staking distribution is pistake
The formal specification of the algorithm can be found in Algorithm 1 in Appendix B. The algorithm state
includes the current stake distribution, the current epoch’s reward set, the current epoch’s slash set, and the
current block time. At a high-level, for each block, we select a validator who should receive a block reward
and decide if they are to be slashed by flipping a coin with probability pslash. If they are slashed, we add
their id and the amount that they are to be slashed to the current epoch’s slash set. Otherwise, we add
them to the block reward set. The algorithm updates the stake distribution on a per epoch basis.
3.2 Lending Model
We will study two models for lending, one involving an explicit model for borrowing demand and one that is
implicit. The implicit model, which is simpler, provides a prototype for constant borrowing demand and is
amenable to theoretical results. On the other hand, the model involving an explicit description of borrowing
demand is more realistic and amenable to being fit by historical data.
3.2.1 Two-State Lending Model
In the two-state lending model, we track the time evolution of two token distributions, pistake(t), pilend(t) ∈
St∆
n, which respectively represent the distribution of staked tokens and those locked in a lending contract.
The ith component of the stake distribution, pistake(t)i, corresponds to the amount of tokens that the ith
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agent has staked. Each agent has a wealth Wi(t) at time t that is equal to the sum of their portfolio of
staked and lent tokens, i.e. Wi(t) = pistake(t)i + pilend(t)i. By definition, the total lending supply is equal to
the sum of all lent portfolios, i.e. `t = ‖pilend(t)‖1, and the total money supply is equal to the sum of all
portfolios, i.e. St = ‖pistake(t)‖1 + ‖pilend(t)‖1. At each time step, agents update their portfolios based on
returns accrued from the previous time step and after portfolios are updated, the lending rate, γt, is updated
based on the total amount lent. This means that we are making two implicit assumptions:
1. Constant relative borrowing demand : We are assuming that ratio of borrowing demand (represented
via a quantity of tokens) to the total token supply stays constant, as the rate only depends on the
lending and staking supplies. Formally, this means that the demand at time t is equal to kSt
2. Flows are the only determining factor : Participants who move tokens from staking to lending or vice
versa are the only causes for changes to the lending rate
We draw inspiration from Compound [33], which provides a simple formula for the borrow lending rate, βt,
and the lending rate, γt. The Compound model computes a utilization rate Ut at block height t, which is the
ratio of the borrowing demand to the token supply locked in the contract, and uses that to update formulas
for βt, γt. Mathematically, they define the utilization rate as
Ut =
kSt
`t + kSt
We compute the borrow and lend rates using the following formulas, where β0, β1 ∈ (0, 1) are interest-rate
parameters and γ0 ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the spread between lending and borrowing (i.e. 1 − γ0 is the
relative spread).
βt = Ut(β0 + β1Ut) (1)
γt = (1− γ0)βt (2)
For reference, the Compound V2 contract uses the values β0 = 5% and β1 = 45%. As depicted in Figure 1,
there can be an enormous amount of volatility in the fraction of the token supply that is lent, `tSt . In §4, we
prove tail bounds on the inflows and outflows of lent tokens over a time step, e.g. Pr[|`t − `t−1| > St], that
explicitly depend on the block reward, Rt and the interest rate parameters. These bounds suggest that even
for the overly simplistic setting of the two-state model, PoS protocols need to carefully choose their block
rewards if they desire to have a large fraction of the outstanding token supply staked at all times.2
3.2.2 Three-State Model
Instead of assuming that there is constant relative borrowing demand, we can relax this by specifying an
additional distribution, piborrow(t), such that pitoken = pistake + pilend + piborrow and St = ζt + `t + ξt, where
ξt = ‖piborrow(t)‖1 is the total amount borrowed at time t. In this world, the utilization ratio is now defined
as:
Ut =
ξt
`t + ξt
Formally analyzing this model has a variety of difficulties that stem from that fact that we have to explicitly
model the borrow demand distribution and disentangle how it couples to each participant’s local model of
risk, which is defined in the next section. In §5, we simulate this model with a variety of different borrowing
demand distributions, but all formal proofs that follow only analyze the two-state lending model. Since the
pool of borrowers (e.g. arbitrageurs) is often disjoint from the pool of stakers and lenders, we will make the
following assumption:
Assumption 9 (Borrowing demand is independent of staking and lending). The borrowing demand distri-
bution piborrow is probabilistically independent of the lending and staking distributions.
2It should be noted that this has been a stated goal of large pools of validators and the existence of staking services that
pool tokens and operate nodes exemplifies this collective desire to have a large portion of the token supply staked [1, 38]
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3.3 State Transition
The final task needed to completely specify this model is to define the state transition rule that sends
pilend(t), piborrow(t), pitoken(t) to pilend(t+ 1), piborrow(t+ 1), pitoken(t+ 1). As per Assumption 9, the evolution
of piborrow(t) is independent of staking and lending, and will be specified separately in §5. We therefore
need to specify state transition rules on a per agent basis, where each agent’s state is their token portfolio
(pistake(t)i, pilend(t)i). Traditionally, the strategy space of rational actors is described via an expected utility
function that an agent aims to maximize by taking various allowable actions. Before specifying the strategy
space that we will sample, let’s consider a few examples to motivate the need for agents who have varying risk
preferences. If at time t, staking is returning more than lending and every agent moves their entire portfolio
from lending to staking, then we will observe a correlated spike in lending rates `t will go to zero and Ut = 1.
Moreover, the relative staking reward to any agent will decrease as St will increase by the amount of tokens
that flow from lending to staking as the expected return on an epoch for an agent is their staked tokens
divided by the token supply, pistake(t)iSt−`t . Thus the greedy strategy of moving all of one’s assets to the higher
yielding activity and causes drastic swings in the relative yields of staking and lending is unstable and doesn’t
accurately represent reality, where token holders have differing risk preferences and will not immediately move
their entire portfolio from staking to lending (or vice-versa). Furthermore, cryptocurrency holders are often
looking for returns that are multiples of their initial investment and have a long time-preference [55]. In our
evolution of each agent’s portfolio, we also assume that an agent making a decision at time t can only use
the information about all portfolios up to time t, {pii(t) : i ∈ [n]}, and the implied rate γt. Since we are
dealing with on-chain lending only, this assumption says that players cannot use strategies that look into
the future and that all agent portfolios are public. In order to capture strategies that are independent of
front-running and latency arbitrage, we will make the following assumption:
Assumption 10 (Martingale Ordering). There exists an [n]-valued martingale Zt that chooses the ordering
in which participants are allowed to update their portfolios at time t to those at time t+ 1.
Under this assumption, agents receive no advantage in expected returns by trying to predict when their
strategy is executed (e.g. is agent 1’s strategy executed before agent 2’s strategy because agent 1 has
more staked than agent 2?). This assumption is reasonable as our goal is to figure out if rational, but
non-Byzantine, agents will cause PoS network security to decrease when on-chain lending activity is sizeable.
3.3.1 Optimal Portfolio Construction
Mean-variance methods, pioneered by Markowitz’s Nobel Prize winning work on portfolio theory [39], provide
a way for rational traders of risky assets to construct portfolios that trade-off individual preferences for
maximizing returns with those of risk minimization. These methods, which are the backbone of the majority
of trillions of dollars of passive portfolios and statistical arbitrage strategies, provide a simple, easy-to-solve
model that involves two parameters for constructing portfolios of n assets: an expected return vector µ ∈ Rn
and a positive-definite covariance matrix Σ ∈ Sn×n+ . Given these parameters, one solves a strongly convex
program that aims to compute the fraction of an agent’s wealth that should be allocated to each asset while
ensuring that the sum of the allocations is one and each entry is positive. In particular, the seminal work of
Markowitz aimed to optimize the quadratic form f : Rn×Rn×R×Sn×n+ → R, f(w, µ, λ,Σ) = wTΣw−λµ,
where λ is a parameter that controls the riskiness of the output portfolio and w is the portfolio allocation.
As λ is varied, the efficient frontier of admissible portfolios is defined as the surface S(µ,Σ) = {w ∈ Rn :
∃λ such that w ∈ arg min f(w, µ,Σ, λ)}. The original work of Markowitz [39] focused on the single period
allocation problem, where an investor aims to find the optimal portfolio over a single time-period, which
corresponds to assuming that µ and Σ do not change over time. Further work on multiple period [34] and
continuous-time methods [56] for mean-variance optimization allow for µ and Σ to vary as functions of time,
with the continuous-time methodology drawing µ from an Iˆto process, such as a solution to the Black-Scholes
equation for options pricing. As blockchain systems have incremental updates with independent games per
update (e.g. transaction fee markets can differ wildly from block to block), we will necessarily have to
consider the multiple period model and define how each agent’s mean vector and risk-preferences evolve over
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time. Finally, we note that our methodology is directly comparable to that of multistrategy backtesting in
quantitative trading [8].
We will assume that each agent treats their token wealth, (pilend(t)i, pistake(t)i) as a Markowitz portfolio
and updates, on receiving tokens from staking and lending, an estimate for a time-dependent return vector
µi(t) ∈ R2. We also assume that each agent has a different, time-independent covariance matrix Σi that
is drawn from a random matrix ensemble3. In other words, the expected return vector adjusts with time
(it depends on the staked and lent quantities), while the covariance stays fixed in time. As long as there
is some variance in the chosen random matrix ensemble (e.g. ∃i, j ∈ [n] such that Pr[Σi 6= Σj ] > 0), then
the dynamics will not deadlock into a state where all participants end up with the same portfolio (e.g. all
outstanding tokens are 100% allocated to staking or lending). If agents simply move all of their assets from
one pool to another, as opposed to some risk-adjusted proportion, then the system can deadlock quickly when
borrowing demand is constant. Using the notation of the prequel, we define µi(t) = µi(pistake(t), pilend(t)) as:
µi(t) =
[
µstake(t)i
µlend(t)i
]
=
[
pistake(t)i
St−`t
γt
]
=
[
pistake(t)i
ζt
γt
]
(3)
Let us motivate this choice of expected return vector. Recall that the return vector is supposed to represent
the relative rate of return (usually referred to as an alpha in the quantitative finance literature) over a riskless
asset. In this situation, the riskless asset is holding our tokens (as bearer instruments) and we expect to
earn yields4 of RtSt−`t and γt for staking and lending, respectively. However, note that the former yield can
be greater than 1 (when St − `t < Rt), whereas the latter yield cannot as per equation (1). In order for
Markowitz optimization to be well-defined, we need to choose yields that are directly comparable (e.g. have
the same range). Moreover, we note that the na¨ıvely calculated staking yield loses the dependence on the ith
party’s current wealth. Since our system allows for slashing and each validator incurs a variance in reward
proportional to the inverse square root of the epoch length, it is preferable to find a yield that depends on
the ith parties wealth to reflect this variance. The simplest estimator for a staking validator’s yield that is
in [0, 1] (comparable to lending yield) and has a component of the variance is the probability of winning the
block reward, pistake(t)iSt−`t , which is exactly what (3) describes.
In order to describe the covariance matrix, we will first state an assumption that aims to connect the variances
in the system with the expected staked and lent times:
Assumption 11. The ith agent’s covariance matrix Σi will be static (e.g. does not vary with block height),
diagonal, and will have variances connected to the expected stake time τstake and expected lent time τlend
Formally we use the following model for the covariance matrix:
Σ−1i =
[
αi 0
0 βi
]
(4)
αi ∼ Exp (τstake) (5)
βi ∼ Exp (τlend) (6)
One can interpret τstake as the expected epoch length (see Algorithm 1), while τlend represents the withdrawal
window under which a lender can remove their tokens from the lent pool.5 By connecting the covariance
matrix to these quantities, we encode the connection between a validator’s expected risk preference and the
3In graphical models and probability, such as the Ising model or spin glasses, this is known as “quenched disorder” [40]
4For staking, the relative yield is defined as future expected staked wealth divided by current stake wealth minus 1, which is
pistake(t)i +Rt
pistake(t)i
St−`t
pistake(t)i
− 1 = Rt
St − `t
This is the standard form of how yields are specified in traditional Markowitz portfolio theory [39].
5This is implemented in a manner analogous to how hedge funds only let you recall your invested capital in small chunks
over a window of time
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time that capital is locked into either staking or lending. Equation (4) represents the fact that risk and time
preferences are, to first-order, inversely correlated (e.g. you are willing to lock up capital for the longest
duration in the least risky assets) [18]. To explain these choices of random variables, first recall that the
Markowitz objective function is of the form f(µ,Σ, w, λ) = wTΣw − λµ, where λ parametrizes the agent’s
preference for return maximization over risk minimization. If we divide this objective function by λ, provided
that λ > 0, we get an equivalent optimization problem for λ−1f . Note that λ can be thought of as encoding
’collective’ risk-preferences for all agents (e.g. a ‘bull market’ when λ is large, a ‘bear market’ when λ is
small). As such we need a methodology for choosing λ that depends on the network size and/or number of
agents. We make λ ∼ χ2(n) in order to capture the fact that as the number of participants increases, so
should the expected number that are risk seeking. Once we do this, we can directly interpret the variables
αi, βi as encoding both this risk preference and the inherent duration difference between lending risk and
staking risk. The static nature of the covariance matrix in Assumption 11 implies that each agent has an
‘equilibrium’ risk-preference. Moreover, this implies that the distribution of risk-preferences amongst changes
is not changing — which one can expect in the limit as the number of agents goes to infinity.6 Making this
assumption allows for significantly faster simulation (e.g. less compute needed to reduce the variance of the
estimator below an error threshold )
To summarize, we evolve the system by having each agent update their Markowitz estimate at each time
step, which changes the lending and staking distributions for the next time step. In simulation, agents will
only be able to migrate their staking tokens at times kτstake, k ∈ N. Explicitly, we evolve the system via the
following loop:
• Initialize distributions {pistake(0)i}i∈[n], {pilend(0)i}i∈[n].
• Initialize empirical distributions {pˆistake(0)i}i∈[n], {pˆilend(0)i}i∈[n]
• For t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
– Observe empirical distributions pˆistake(t)i, pˆilend(t)i
(generated via actual staking / lending rewards accrued in the epoch)
– Compute Markowitz weights wi,t = (p, 1− p), p = p(pˆistake(t)i, pˆilend(t)i, αi, βi) ∈ [0, 1]
– Define new portfolio as pi(t) = p(pi(t− 1) + `i(t− 1)), `i(t) = (1− p)(pi(t− 1) + `i(t− 1))
4 Formal Properties
We will describe a few formal properties (proved in the appendix) of the two-state model, as it is feasible
to analytically analyze this model. Our goal in this section is to bound the amount of turnover in the stake
distribution that is caused by on-chain lending becoming more attractive than staking rewards to rational
stakers. A secondary goal is to understand what properties of the stochastic processes that represent the
evolution of the lending and staking distributions are necessary and/or sufficient for ensuring that we do not
have a lot of volatility in agent token portfolios. This is important as volatility in these portfolios implies
that PoS networks have volatile security, which is a distinct defect when compared to PoW. We will make a
few additional assumptions that are necessary to provide analytical results:
Assumption 12 (Bounded Size). There is a minimum fraction δ > 0 of the money supply that needs to be
staked, e.g. St − `t > δSt
If no one is staking then the on-chain lending contract has no value (as it doesn’t have any security), so this
is a realistic assumption that matches the practical parameters chosen in live networks such as Tezos [23]
and Cosmos [10]. Note that one can directly interpret δ as the fraction of altruistic validators who will never
reallocate or rebalance their assets.
6The easiest way to see this is to note that one expects a central limit theorem (e.g. Marchenko-Pastur law [53]) for the
distribution of 1√
n
∑n
i=1 Σi. Thus, as the number of participants goes to infinity, we get closer and closer to having the staticity
assumption hold true
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Assumption 13 (Number of Agents). The number of agents n is larger than a constant multiple of the
product of the exponential parameters, e.g. n = Ω(τstakeτlend).
This assumption is required for purely technical reasons that are explained in the proofs in the appendix.7
If we solve the unconstrained problem8 for the Markowitz objective function, f(µ,Σ, w, λ) = wTΣw − λµ,
then w needs to satisfy the first-order condition, ∇wf(µ,Σ, w, λ) = 0. This yields,
w = λΣ−1µ (7)
Given that we are in the multi-period Markowitz setting, this means that we can estimate the ith participant’s
portfolio weights via wi(t) = λΣ
−1
i µi(t). As a measure of volatility in the security of the underlying staking
mechanism, we will first look at how wi(t) changes in time. Intuitively, this change corresponds to how
large rebalancing events (e.g. moving tokens from staking to lending, or vice-versa) are between subsequent
blocks. If this rebalancing is large, then the network could dramatically reduce it’s security as holders move
their assets from staking to lending. On the other hand, if this rebalancing is small and decreases over time,
then we know that the staked token supply is stable. Using the Markowitz update rule (7), we have the
following bound.
‖wi(t+ 1)− wi(t)‖1 = ‖Σ−1(µi(t+ 1)− µi(t))‖1 ≤ ‖Σ−1‖1→1‖µi(t+ 1)− µi(t)‖1 (8)
where ‖A‖1→1 = maxv∈Rn,‖v‖1=1 ‖Av‖1 is the L1 operator norm. This simple inequality implies that the
volatility in portfolio weights, represented by the single block difference in weights, is controlled by the
difference in the mean vector, as E[‖Σ−1‖1→1] = E[α ∨ β] ≤ τstake ∨ τlend. Therefore, we focus on trying to
bound the difference in expected returns as a function of the block reward at time t, Rt, the total token
supply St, the lent supply `t, and the Compound lending curve parameters β0, β1.
Let pistake(t+ 1)i − pistake(t)i = ∆stakei (t) and `t+1 − `t = ∆lend(t). Since the PoS algorithm is adapted to a
filtration Ft on St∆n and the covariance matrices are constant as time evolves,9 pistake(t), pilend(t) are also
Ft-adapted random variables. Note that by definition, ∆stakei (t) ≤ St and ∆lend(t) ≤ St, since we cannot
change the amount staked or lent by more than the outstanding money supply. We will first bound the
difference in expected returns as a function of ∆stakei (t),∆lend(t), and St:
Claim 1. There exist constants C,C ′ > 0 such that
‖µi(t+ 1)− µi(t)‖1 < C|∆
stake
i (t)|
St+1
+ C ′∆2lend(t)
Note that these constants are allowed to depend on δ from Assumption 12. If we have an compounding and
inflationary rewards schedule, e.g. St = e
λt, then this claim implies the following:
Claim 2. If there exists λ > τstake such that St = Ω(e
λt) and miniWi(t) > 0, then as t→∞, the maximum
change in stake is bounded above by the lending volatility, ∆2lend(t), w.h.p.
This claim implies that if there is not much variance in the lending rate, either due to choosing small
parameters β0, β1 or because borrowing demand is minimal, then we should not expect portfolios to rebalance
regularly and rational stakers will tend to keep their tokens locked in a staking contract. Another natural
quantity to look at is the variance of the lent assets. We show that the money supply and time-preference
for lending, τlend, control the variance of lent assets.
7Also note that the equilibrium assumption (Assumption 11) implicitly also requires a lower bound on n that is a function
of τstake and τlend in order for the covariance matrix distribution to be  away from the limit distribution
8In the constrained version of the problem needs to satisfy Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions [37] that enforce wT 1 = 1 and
wi > 0, ∀i. For simplicity of exposition, we elided these during this section (even though these conditions are satisfied during
simulation).
9In particular, they are random at time t = 0 and defined in F0, but are constant throughout. This is a measure theoretic
way of defining quenched disorder [52]
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Claim 3. Let Ft be the filtration such that the lending process `t is adapted. Then we have:
Var[`t+1|Ft] = γt
τ2lend
‖W (t)‖22
Moreover, we have the following bounds:
γ2t S
2
t
τ2lend
√
n
≤ Var[`t+1|Ft] ≤ γ
2
t S
2
t
τ2lend
Note that if k is the constant representing the ratio of borrowing demand to St (c.f. §3.2.1), there exists a
constant10 ℵ that depends on k such that γt ≥ ℵ. As such, Claim 3 implies that as long as St = Ω
(
n
1
4
)
, we
have reallocation from staking to lending. Thus, any monetary policy that grows sufficiently quickly with
the number of users of the network will always have assets moving into and out of lending. If we place
constraints on the demand k, we can strengthen this result into a bound on how much ∆2lend oscillates:
Claim 4. Let ηt = 1 +
‖W (t)‖22
S2t
≥ 1 + 1√
n
and αt =
`tτlend
Stηt
If for all t, k ≥ αt1−αt , where and the hypotheses of
claim 2 hold, then ∆2lend(t) is a submartingale and we have
Pr
[
max
t
∆2lend(t) > λ
]
<
1
λ2
Var[∆2lend(t)]
and subsequently,
Pr
[
max
t
‖µi(t+ 1)− µi(t)‖1 > λ
]
<
1
λ2
Var[∆2lend(t)] (9)
In words, this claim says that as long as we have inflation and there is enough borrowing demand, then
we can be sure that the worst-case rebalancing is bounded by the variance of lending volatility. If we add
another constraint on the behavior of the increments ∆2lend(t), then we can strengthen this claim to get a
phase transition that resembles the Galton-Watson phase transition [4].
Claim 5. Suppose that for all t > 0,∆lend(t) <
`2t
2`t−1ηt
, E[∆lend(t)] > 0, and let ηt be as in Claim 4. Define
r± as follows:
r± =
`tτlend
Stηt
(
1±
√
1 +
ηt`t−1(`t−1 − 2`t)
`2t
)
Then `2t is a supermartingale when γt ∈ (r−, r+), a submartingale when γt ∈ [0, r−)∪(r+, 1], and a martingale
when γt ∈ {r−, r+}.
The intuition for this is as follows:
• When there is either too little or too much borrowing demand (e.g. γt < r− or γt > r+), then the
expected lent supply either increases (on average) to one or decreases to zero. This is analogous to a
gambler’s wealth after playing a game with probability p < 1/2 for n rounds — the wealth concentrates
into either the house (staked supply) or the gambler (lent supply).
• When there is a moderate amount of borrowing demand, γt ∈ [r−, r+], then we have stable, potentially
oscillatory behavior. Doob’s Supermartingale Convergence Theorem [7] intimates that the distribution
is stationary as t→∞. This corresponds to a gambler playing a game in which their chance of winning
is p > 1/2.
These results for the simpler two-level model suggest that our simulated phase transition results convey the
existence of a deeper phase transition.
10Since Ut =
kSt
`t+kSt
and Assumption 12 implies that `t < (1− δ)St, we have Ut > kk+1−δ and γt > β1
(
k
k+1
)2
+ β0
k
k+1
.
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Agent-level Behavior In order to get a stronger understanding of what is going on at the agent level
and for different monetary policies, one needs an understanding of the probability that a single agent has
a large rebalancing event that affects the staked portion of their portfolio. This involves studying how the
staking components of µi(t) changes over time. Let µstake(t)i be the different in the staking component of
µi(t) between times t and t + 1. We can bound the probability that an agent rebalances their portfolio by
an  fraction via the following claim:
Claim 6. Let µstake(t)i =
pistake(t+1)i
St+1−`t+1 −
pistake(t)i
St−`t . Then for all t > 0, we have
Pr [|µstake(t)i| < | Ft−1] = Ω
(
1−
((
St+1
γt
)n
e−τstakeτlend
St+1
γt
))
(10)
Bounds like (10) are of the form Pr[Xt < ] = Yt, which imply that the extrema of Yt provide a guaranteed
bound of how large Xt can be when Yt is minimized. This means that we can try to bound the first hitting
time t∗ for the maxima of |µstake(t)i| by analyzing the minima of the right-hand side of (10). Note that the
function 1− (kx)ne−k′kx has a minima at x = nkn−2k′ , which means that we can estimate when, as a function
of St, γt, , we have maximal deviations in stake. In the following section, we examine this claim for different
monetary policies St.
4.1 Deflationary Monetary Policy
In this case, Rt = kr
−t, r < 1 and St =
k(1−r−t−1)
1−r = C∞−C ′r−t−1, where C∞ is the final money supply (e.g.
21 million, for Bitcoin). Letting  = δSt+1 and plugging this into the right hand side of (10) and optimizing
for t using the chain rule gives the condition t∗ = − log
(
C −
√
nδ
γtτstakeτlend
)
. Requiring that t∗ > 0 gives the
condition C −√nδγtτstakeτlend ∈ (0, 1) or
δ >
(C∞ − 1)γtτstakeτlend
n
The above condition implies that at the time with the highest expected amount of removed stake, we expect
that quantity to at be on the order of C∞n . If there are fewer terminal coins than participants, C∞  n, then
we should expect large rebalances for every staker. This formalizes the intuition that totally deflationary
currencies are vulnerable to large rebalances that depend strongly on the number of coins in the system. It
also confirms the intuition that if there are fewer coins than participants, then borrowing demand will be
high and we should again expect large rebalances.
4.2 Inflationary Monetary Policy
Next, we consider what Claim 6 implies about inflationary monetary policies. We will consider two types of
inflationary policies: Polynomial (St = Ω(t
k)) and Exponential (St = Ω(e
λt)).
4.2.1 Polynomial Inflation
For polynomial inflation, we have Rt = ct
k−1 and St = Ω(tk). Optimizing (10) with this form of St gives
t∗ =
(
nδ
γtτstakeτlend
)1/k
. Plugging this into the right-hand side of (10) gives a lower bound of
1− δ
2n
γtτstakeτlend
e−τstakeτlendδ
2n/γt
which means that if δ = O(n−1/2), individual agents will not have rebalances of size δSt with high probability.
These guarantees do not depend on the polynomial degree k, which means that even simple linear policies
(k = 1) are sufficient to get low stake turnover.
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4.2.2 Exponential Inflation
In the case of exponential inflation, St = C0e
λt for some λ > 0 and initial token distribution C0. Following
the logic of the §4.1 section, we arrive at a conclusion of,
δ >
C0γtτstakeτlend
n
This states that the worst-case rebalancing is bounded by the initial token distribution as opposed to the
final token distribution. Given that most networks assume that there will be more users than the initial
distribution, C0, this implies that large rebalancing events should become rarer once the network achieves a
scale of n C0.
4.3 Conclusions
The results of this section show that the model of §3.3 has a volatility that is mainly dependent on lending
volatility. This volatility, if demand is sufficiently shallow, is small enough to help bound the worst-case
portfolio rebalancing for any validator in the system. However, the turnover in staked quantity, measured
by how each agent’s expected reward changes over each epoch period, is sensitive to the precise nature of
the monetary policy, St. In particular, deflationary policies cannot support on-chain lending, as the worst-
case rebalancing rate depends on the terminal money supply, whereas the rebalancing rate for exponentially
inflationary monetary policies only depends on the initial money supply (e.g. Ethereum’s pre-mine). Finally,
we note that polynomial inflation provides particularly good rebalancing guarantees that are independent of
the rate of growth of the money supply. Many of these results rely on asymptotic behavior of agents in this
system and all of these results depend on simple models for borrowing demand. The remainder of the paper
will focus on using simulation to provide a more realistic picture of §3.3.
5 Agent-Based Simulations
In order to test the three-state model in a quantitatively rigorous and realistic fashion, we turn to agent-
based simulations. One of the main reasons to use agent-based simulation over formal methods is that it
hard to formally prove what block reward growth rate is ideal for mitigating volatility in portfolio allocation.
For instance, it is difficult to evaluate whether Rt = Ω(t
2) or Rt = Ω(t) provide ideal mitigation for on-chain
lending with parameters β0, β1. Moreover, we can test various realistic demand distributions, including
ones that are atomic and do not have a probability density. Prior work on agent-based simulations of
blockchain systems [16] has focused on analyzing consensus protocols via event-based simulation. We follow
a similar event-based framework for simulating staking and lending, albeit ignoring the details of peer-to-
peer networking and consensus. Our goal is to sample as many trajectories Xt|Ft = (pistake(t), pilend(t), γt)
as possible for different combinations of parameters β0, β1, and block reward schedules Rt.
5.1 Initialization
In order to generate sample paths Xt, we need to specify the following variables:
• Initial distributions: pistake(0), pilend(0)
• Initial interest rate: γ0 ∈ (0, 1)
• Interest rate parameters: β0, β1 ∈ (0, 1)
• Demand-generating distribution parameters (vary depending on the demand generating distributions
chosen): Pξ
• Staking and lending time scale: τstake, τlend
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• Slashing probability: pslash
• PRNG seed: s ∈ Z264
We chose to model pistake(0)i ∼ Exp(λstake) and pilend(0)i ∼ Exp(λlend), as these distributions exemplify the
extreme concentration of wealth that accompanies most token distributions. Exponential distributions are
also useful in that the order statistics are also exponential11, which represents the idea that the kth entrant
to a network should have a decaying fraction (in this case 1k ) of the total token supply. We note that we do
not use power law distributions as there are conflicting reports of the wealth distribution in Bitcoin actually
following a power law [31, 3]. Given the statistical difficulty of discerning if one has a power law versus an
exponential decay [49, 51] and the extra parameter in a power law (e.g. p(x = t) ∝ xmint−a), we decided to
use exponential initial distributions.
In our simulations, we kept the initial interest rate at 10%, as we saw very little sensitivity to the initial choice.
In particular, agents quickly rebalance their portfolio into lending, if the rate is high enough and this appeared
to equilibrate within a small number of time steps. We swept the other parameters, β0, β1, τstake, τlend, pslash,
over realistic ranges and for each choice of parameter, we sampled trajectories for a variety of seeds s to get
an ensemble average.
5.2 Simulation Loop
The main simulation loop follows that as described at the end of §3.3. We exactly evaluate the Markowitz
update rule, with constraints, via the exact solution for optimal portfolios [8]. Given that we are solving n
independent, two-dimensional Markowitz problems, we evaluated the constraints analytically (as opposed to
using a convex solver like Gurobi or CVX). The main event loop has the following causal ordering:
1. If t = kτstake for some k ∈ N, allow agents to update their Markowitz portfolios12
2. Sample the borrowing demand distribution
3. Update γt as a function of the new borrowing demand
4. Run Algorithm 1 to determine who wins the reward Rt and/or if they get slashed
5.3 Borrowing Demand Distributions
We sampled a variety of borrowing demand distributions for deflationary and inflationary block rewards,
as illustrated via the sample paths in Figure 4. These stochastic borrowing demand paths each have four
parameters: mean, variance, maximum, and minimum demand. We define the maximum and minimum
demand parameters as multipliers of the token supply, so that the minimum is (1− η0)St and the maximum
is (1 + η1)St (illustrated via the lower and upper bounds in figure 4, respectively).
5.4 Results
In order to evaluate a variety of realistic conditions, we swept through many parameters illustrated above.
The most interesting results come from looking at individual trajectories, such as 1, and heatmaps of how
certain scalar functions behave as we vary the lending rate parameters β0, β1. We generated heatmaps for
number of random seeds and took averages over these random instantiations to generate Figures 6 and
7. The two main measurements that we looked at were f(β0, β1) = Et
[
St−`t
St+`t
∣∣∣∣∣β0, β1, τ
]
and g(β0, β1) =
Et[γt − βt|β0, β1, τ ], where given a non-anticipating stochastic process Xt and a function stopped at time τ ,
11If pistake(0)(1) < . . . < pistake(0)(n) are the order statistics for the stake distribution, then pistake(0)(i+1) − pistake(0)(i) ∼
Exp
(
λstake
n−i
)
and by the tower property for telescoping sums, E[pistake(0)(i)]] = Θ
(
log i
λstake
)
12Note that Assumption 10 allows us to sample the agent portfolio updates in any order
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Figure 4: Borrowing demand sample paths, ξt, juxtaposed with the money supply St. The sample paths
in the upper left (linear, Rt = c), upper right (deflationary, Rt = kr
t, r < 1), and lower left (inflationary,
Rt = kr
t, r > 1) use simple random walks, whereas the figure in the lower right samples a geometric Brownian
motion path with reflecting boundary conditions at (1− η0)St, (1 + η1)St.
Et[f(Xt)|τ ] =
∫ τ
0
f(Xt)dXt, for the stochastic measure dXt. We ran all trajectories for τ =250,000 blocks
and approximate Et[f(Xt)|τ ] ≈
∑τ/∆
i=0 f(Xi)ξi, where ξi is sampled from dXt+∆ − dXt. The first quantity,
f(β0, β1), is the normalized difference between the staked supply and the lent supply and when it is greater
than zero, there is more quantity staked, on average. It is normalized relative to the total money supply
St + `t so that ∀t, St−`tSt+`t ∈ (0, 1) and thus we can compare the relative staking to lending proportions at
different times. The second quantity, g(β0, β1) measures the linear spread between borrowing and lending
rates, which varies over time even though 1− γ0 = βt−γtβt is constant. If the market for borrowing is efficient
and there is less churn, we should expect that this rate should be quite low. Note that in all simulations
used, we set the relative spread, 1− γ0, to be 0.5%.
In Figure 5, we see plots of f(β0, β1) for different inflation rates r ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1.0}. Note that when r = 1.0,
then we have a linear polynomial inflation rate. This figure demonstrates that even though the dependence
on β0, β1 appears to be random, it is clear that the deflationary figures tend to have significantly more
lending than staking. On the other hand, the linearly inflating component enjoys a significant advantage
with regards to staked supply. Note that the dependence on β0, β1 appears mostly random because of the
use of a common scale to plot them. The usage of a common scale dampens the correct scale to plot the
figures at (which should be on the order of Var(f(β0, β1)), which varies dramatically as a function of the
other parameters that we sample, such as the block reward. In some of the other plots that we will look at,
we use independent color scales for each plot to emphasize the variation as a function of β0 and β1.
On the other hand, in figure 6, we see an array of plots that show how the borrowing spread, g(β0, β1 changes
as a function of inflation rate and borrowing threshold. The third column, which is the linearly increasing
block rewards regime, demonstrates very tight spreads, suggesting that even changing the borrowing demand
threshold causes little variation in spreads. On the other hand, the deflationary regime is much more sensitive
to shocks in borrowing demand, as illustrated by the plots in the upper left hand corner of figure 6. These
empirical results validate Claims 2 and 3, as we directly see that lending volatility has a much more muted
effect on inflationary systems.
Finally, in figure 7, we see heatmaps of f(β0, β1) for different borrowing thresholds and inflation rates. Note
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Figure 5: Heat maps of f(β0, β1) = Et
[
St−`t
St+`t
∣∣∣∣β0, β1] for different deflation schedules at a half-life equal to
0.25% of the total simulation time (400 Bitcoin-style halvenings occur). Each pixel is the average of 100
random initializations with the other parameters fixed. On the left, we have a very high deflationary rate
and we can see that the values are negative, implying that `t > St, whereas on the far right picture, which
is non-deflationary, we see that St > `t
that these plots have different scales, unlike 5, and that the deflationary figures are all mainly negative. From
the first two columns, it becomes clear that as borrowing demand increases, g(β0, β1) becomes increasingly
monotonically decreasing in β0, β1. This means that as borrowing demand increases, the system’s loss of
security to lending increases in a more predictable manner. On the other hand, the linearly inflating regime
does not have this issue and continues to have relatively random and non-monotonic dependence on β0, β0
as we adjust the borrowing threshold.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has explored how on-chain lending affects network security in PoS networks by studying how
rational multiple period Markowitz optimizing agents optimize their token portfolios. In particular, we find
that ‘bank runs’ can occur when many agents collectively move their tokens from staking contracts to lending
contracts even when agents have indpendently drawn risk preferences. These attacks, which are coordinated
only by rational optimization, show that the strictly Byzantine threat model is insufficient to describe security
in PoS networks. Our theoretical and empirical findings show that deflationary PoS tokens are susceptible
to attack by non-Byzantine, but rational participants who constantly turnover and rebalance their staking
and lending portfolios to chase yield. Moreover, these findings show that one needs to choose a block reward
schedule that increases relative to the yield that these on-chain contracts provide. Our theoretical results
give explicit probabilities for the constant relative borrowing demand regime and show that there is a clear
and strong dependence on the lending rate γt in these probabilities. We buffet these results with agent-based
simulations to confirm that these properties hold in more realistic borrowing scenarios. In the future, we
aim to look at how unbonding times and transaction fees (e.g. gas costs) affect these protocols and how
different lending curves will affect staking security. We also aim to provide more precise theoretical results
by relaxing a number of the assumptions that are utilized in this paper.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Yi Sun, Rei Chiang, Hasu, Haseeb Qureshi, Ivan Bogatyy, Georgios Kon-
stantopoulos, John Morrow, Tony Salvatore, Wei Wang, Hsien-Tang Kao, Jonathan Reem, Josh Chen, Tina
Zhen, Nader Al-Naji, Michael Jordan, Tim Roughgarden, and Matteo Leibowitz for comments and feedback.
The author would also like to thank Barnabe´ Monnot and Ariah Klages-Mundt for correcting an earlier error
in Claim 1 and for helpful expository comments. Finally, the author would like to acknowledge the helpful
input from the reviewers of both the Stanford Blockchain Conference and the MIT Cryptoeconomics Systems
17
Figure 6: Plots of g(β0, β1) = E[γt − βt|β0, β1]. As you go from left to right, we increase the inflation rate
r (recall that when r < 1, we are deflationary) and as we go from top to bottom, the borrow threshold
increased. Recall that the borrow threshold is the lower bound line from figure 4. We see that when the
system has linearly increasing block rewards, we receive very tight spreads and a smooth, almost linear
g(β0, β1). On the other hand, as we have increasing deflationary policies, we see that we cause the expected
spread to become more random and larger.
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Figure 7: Plots of f(β0, β1) for differing inflation rates and borrowing thresholds. Note that the color bars
vary for each figure. We see that when the policy is deflationary, f(β0, β1) < 0. Moreover, when the
borrowing threshold is high, we cause the plots to become less random and have a more clear dependence
on β0, β1.
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Appendix
A Notation
• ∆n is n-dimensional probability simplex, ∆n = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1,∀i, xi ≥ 0}
• For any x ∈ Rn, we define the p-norm as ‖x‖p = (
∑n
i=1 |xi|p)1/p.
• We turn any nonzero vector x ∈ Rn with x ≥ 0 into a probability distribution by defining xˆ = x‖x‖1 ∈
∆n.
• Sn+ ⊂ Rn×n is the cone of positive definite, symmetric matrices
• ∨,∧ are the standard join and meet of two elements of a lattice. For example if a, b ∈ R, a ∨ b =
max(a, b), a ∧ b = min(a, b)
• We use standard Landau notation [50] on totally ordered setsD: Given functions f : D → R, g : D → R,
we use the following asymptotic notations:
– f ∈ O(g) ⇐⇒ ∃C > 0,∀d ∈ D, f(d) ≤ Cg(d)
– f ∈ Ω(g) ⇐⇒ ∃c > 0,∀d ∈ D, f(d) ≥ cg(d)
– f ∈ o(g) ⇐⇒ limd→supD f(d)g(d) = 0
– f ∈ Θ(g) ⇐⇒ f ∈ O(g) and f ∈ Ω(g)
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B PoS Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Epoch-based PoS Simulation
pistake ← pistake(0) ∈ ∆n Initial token distribution
R→ ∅ Initialize current epoch’s reward set
S → ∅ Initialize current epoch’s slash set
t← 0
for epoch ∈ N do
# Update Staking Distribution
for id in {1, . . . , nstakers} do
if (id, reward) ∈ R then
pistake[id]+ = reward
end if
if (id, slash) ∈ S then
pistake[id]− = slash
end if
R← ∅, S ← ∅
# Draw next epoch from stake distribution
pˆistake ← pistake‖pistake‖1 Create normalized probability distribution
for block ∈ {1, . . . , τstake} do
id ∼ pˆistake # Draw a winner from the stake distribution
X ∼ Bern(pslash)
if X == 1 then
if ∃(id, s) ∈ S then
S ← S ∪ {(id, s− S(id, pistake))}
S ← S − {(id, s)}
else
if ∃(id, r) ∈ R then
R← R ∪ {(id, r +R(t))}
R← R− {(id, r)}
end if
end if
end if
t += 1
end for
end for
end for
C Proof of Claim 1
In Assumption 12, we assert that for all t, St− `t > δSt or 1− `tSt > δ and 11− `tSt
< 1δ . Since the function
1
1−x
is convex on [0, 1], we have, for any x ∈ [0, 1− δ], s ∈ [0, 1], 11−x < s
(
1
δ
)
+ (1− s) = s ( 1−δδ )+ 1. Using this
bound on the function 1
1− `tSt
, we have, for any s ∈ [0, 1]:
1
St − `t =
1
St
1
1− `tSt
<
1
St
(
s
(
1− δ
δ
)
+ 1
)
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In particular, since `t < St, we can use this bound at s =
`t
St
to get
1
St − `t <
1
St
(
`t
St
(
1− δ
δ
)
+ 1
)
(11)
This implies that
µstake(t)i =
pistake(t+ 1)i
St − `t <
pistake(t+ 1)i
St
(
`t
St
(
1− δ
δ
)
+ 1
)
Note that the condition St − `t > δSt also implies that `tSt < 1− δ, so that we can right this as:
µstake(t)i =
pistake(t+ 1)i
St − `t <
pistake(t+ 1)i
St
(
(1− δ)2
δ
+ 1
)
On the other hand, since St > St − `t, we also have µstake(t)i > pistake(t+1)iSt . Thus we have
|µstake(t+ 1)i − µstake(t)i| = Θ
(
pistake(t+ 1)i
St+1
− pistake(t)i
St
)
Let f(δ) be a constant such that
|µstake(t+ 1)i − µstake(t)i| ≤ f(δ)
(
pistake(t+ 1)i
St+1
− pistake(t)i
St
)
which exists as per the last statement. Given these equation, we can now bound the single time step rebalance
as follows:
‖µi(t+ 1)− µi(t)‖1 =
∣∣∣∣pistake(t+ 1)iSt − `t − pistake(t)iSt − `t
∣∣∣∣+ |γt+1 − γt|
≤ f(δ)
∣∣∣∣pistake(t+ 1)iSt+1 − pistake(t)iSt
∣∣∣∣+ β1γ0
∣∣∣∣∣
(
`t+1
St+1
)2
−
(
`t
St
)2∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣pistake(t+ 1)iSt +Rt − pistake(t)iSt
∣∣∣∣+ β1γ0
∣∣∣∣∣
(
`t+1
St +Rt
)2
−
(
`t
St
)2∣∣∣∣∣
≤ f(δ)
∣∣∣∣pistake(t)i + ∆stakei (t)St +Rt − pistake(t)iSt
∣∣∣∣+ β1γ0
∣∣∣∣∣
(
`t + ∆lend(t)
St +Rt
)2
−
(
`t
St
)2∣∣∣∣∣
≤ pistake(t)i
∣∣∣∣ f(δ)St +Rt − f(δ)St
∣∣∣∣+ f(δ)|∆stakei (t)|St +Rt + β1γ0
∣∣∣∣∣
(
`t + ∆lend(t)
St +Rt
)2
−
(
`t
St
)2∣∣∣∣∣
≤ pistake(t)i kf(δ)Rt
(St +Rt)2
+
f(δ)|∆stakei (t)|
St +Rt
+ β1γ0`t
(
`t(2StRt +R
2
t )
S2t (St +Rt)
2
+
1
(St +Rt)2
(
(2|∆lend(t)|+ ∆
2
lend(t)
`t
))
≤ pistake(t)i f(δ)Rt
(St +Rt)2
+
f(δ)|∆stakei (t)|
St +Rt
+ β1γ0`t
(
Θ
(
1
S2t
)
+
2|∆lend(t)|
(St +Rt)2
+
∆2lend(t)
`t
)
≤ f(δ)
St +Rt
(
|∆stakei (t)|+
2β1γ0`t +Rt
St
)
+ β1γ0∆
2
lend(t) (12)
D Proof of Claim 2
Since Rt = o(2
n), St =
∑
i<tRi, we reach the desired conclusion if for any β ∈ (0, 1],Pr[|∆stakei (t)| > Sβ1t ] =
O(2−S
β
t ). Let Wi(t) = pistake(t)i + pilend(t)i be the wealth of agent i. Then the unconstrainted Markowitz
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update gives,
pistake(t+ 1)i =
αipistake(t)i
St − `t Wi(t)
where αi is the inverse covariance sample for agent i. Thus,
|∆stakei (t)| = |pistake(t+ 1)i − pistake(t)i| = pistake(t)i
∣∣∣∣αiWi(t)St − `t − 1
∣∣∣∣
Thus, we have:
Pr
[
|∆stakei (t)| > Sβt
]
= Pr
[
pistake(t)i
∣∣∣∣αiWi(t)St − `t − 1
∣∣∣∣ > Sβt ] (13)
= Pr
[
αi >
(
St − `t
Wi(t)
)
(Sβt + pistake(t)i)
]
< 2−τstakeS
β
t (14)
where the last step holds since αi is an exponential random variable with parameter τstake.
E Proof of Claim 3
Recall that βi was defined in equation 4 and is different than the lending rate βt. Note the following, which
uses βi ∼iid Exp(τlend):
E[`2t+1|Ft] = E
(γt n∑
i=1
βiWi(t)
)2 ∣∣∣∣Ft
 (15)
= γ2t E
 n∑
i=1
β2iWi(t)
2 +
∑
i6=j
βiβjWi(t)Wj(t)
 (16)
= γ2t
 2
τ2lend
n∑
i=1
Wi(t)
2 +
1
τ2lend
∑
i6=j
Wi(t)Wj(t)
 (17)
= γ2t
 1
τ2lend
(
n∑
i=1
Wi(t)
)2
+
1
τ2lend
n∑
i=1
Wi(t)
2
 (18)
= γ2t
(
S2t
τ2lend
+
1
τ2lend
n∑
i=1
Wi(t)
2
)
(19)
= γ2t
(
S2t
τ2lend
+
‖W (t)‖22
τ2lend
)
(20)
Furthermore, we have the following:
E[`t+1|Ft] = E
[
n∑
i=1
γtβiWi(t)
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
γtSt
τlend
(21)
Combining equations (20) and (21) yields:
Var[`t+1|Ft] = E[`2t+1|Ft]− (E[`t+1|Ft])2 =
γ2t ‖W (t)‖22
τ2lend
(22)
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as claimed. As the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies that ‖x‖22 ≤ ‖x‖21 ≤
√
n‖x‖22 and St = ‖W (t)‖1, we
have:
1 ≤ S
2
t
‖W (t)‖22
=
‖W (t)‖21
‖W (t)‖22
≤ √n (23)
Thus we have the final part of the claim:
Var[`t+1|Ft] = γt‖W (t)‖
2
2
τ2lend
=
γtS
2
t
τ2lend
(‖W (t)‖22
S2t
)
∈ γtS
2
t
τ2lend
[
1√
n
, 1
]
(24)
F Proof of Claim 4
Noting that γt =
kSt
`t+kSt
= 1
1+
`t
kSt
implies that for the choice of k in the claim, (20) is greater than `2t and
thus `2t is a non-negative submartingale with bounded differences (e.g. ∆
2
lend(t) ≤ S2t ). In particular, note
that γt ≥ β1
(
k
k+1
)2
+ β0
(
k
k+1
)
= Ω
(
k
k+1
)
. Thus via equation (20), we have:
E[`2t |Ft] =
γ2t S
2
t
τ2lend
(
1 +
‖W (t)‖22
S2t
)
=
γ2t S
2
t ηt
τ2lend
≥ C ′
(
k
k + 1
)2
S2t ηt
τ2lend
(25)
The choice k = Ω
(
αt
1−αt
)
ensures that the right-hand side of equation (25) is greater than `2t . The norm
equivalence between a non-negative submartingale and its quadaratic variation (e.g. Burkholder’s inequality
[11]) applies to `2t and implies that ∆
2
lend(t) is also a submartingale. Note that this relies on the being able
to pass bounds on the quadratic variation process to the individual increments, which only applies to the
discrete setting [35]. The tail bound (9) comes from Doob’s submartingale inequality and Kolmogorov’s
inequality for submartingales [7].
G Proof of Claim 5
Recall that ∆2lend(t) is a martingale if E[∆
2
lend(t)|Ft] = ∆2lend(t), a supermartingale if E[∆2lend(t)|Ft] ≤
∆2lend(t), and a submartingale if E[∆
2
lend(t)|Ft] ≥ ∆2lend(t). The expansion of E[∆2lend(t+ 1)|Ft] is;
E[∆2lend(t)|Ft] = E[(`t+1 − `t)2|Ft]
= E[`2t+1|Ft]− 2`tE[`t+1|Ft] + `2t
=
γ2t S
2
t ηt
τ2lend
− 2`t γtSt
τlend
+ `2t (26)
Define the quadratic function f : R→ R as:
f(γt) = γ
2
t
(
S2t ηt
τ2lend
)
− γt
(
2`tSt
τlend
)
+
(
`2t − (`2t − 2`t`t−1 + `2t−1)
)
= γ2t
(
S2t ηt
τ2lend
)
− γt
(
2`tSt
τlend
)
+
(
2`t`t−1 − `2t−1
)
(27)
Note that f(γt) = E[∆
2
lend(t)|Ft]−∆2lend(t−1) so that the roots of f correspond to when ∆2lend is a martingale.
Moreover, when f > 0,∆2lend(t) is a submartingale, and a supermartingale otherwise. Thus, we only need to
find the roots of f and to figure out when f > 0 and f < 0 to classify this transition. The roots of f, r± are:
r± =
`tτlend
Stηt
(
1±
√
1 +
ηt`t−1(`t−1 − 2`t)
`2t
)
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Thus, the roots are real if and only if we have:
ηt(2`t`t−1 − `2t−1) < `2t
⇐⇒ ηt`t−1(∆lend(t− 1) + `t) < `2t (28)
⇐⇒ ∆lend(t− 1) < `
2
t
ηt`t−1
− `t (29)
⇒∆lend(t− 1) < `t
(
`t
2`t−1
− 1
)
(30)
Recall that for a quadratic function f(x) = ax2 + bx+ c with real roots r±, we have f−1((−∞, 0)) = [r−, r+]
if f
(
r++r−
2
)
= f
(− b4a) < 0, otherwise f−1((−∞, 0)) = (−∞, r−) ∪ (r+,∞). For equation (27), we have
−b
4a =
`tτlend
2Stηt
, which gives:
f
(
`tτlend
2Stηt
)
=
(
`2t τ
2
lend
4S2t η
2
t
)(
S2t ηt
τ2lend
)
−
(
`tτlend
2Stηt
)(
2`tSt
τlend
)
+ `t−1(∆lend(t− 1) + `t)
=
`2t
4ηt
− `
2
t
ηt
+ `t−1(∆lend(t− 1) + `t)
= −3`
2
t
4ηt
+ `t−1(∆lend(t− 1) + `t) (31)
Note that equation (31) is less than zero when
∆lend(t− 1) < `t
(
3`t
4`t−1
− 1
)
which is already subsumed by the condition for having real roots. Thus, provided that r± ∈ (0, 1), we have
the desired conclusion.
H Proof of Claim 6
As before, let the ith agent’s token wealth be denoted Wi(t) = pistake(t)i + pilend(t)i. Using the Markowitz
update rule, we have the following:
µstake(t)i =
pistake(t+ 1)i
St+1 − `t+1 −
pistake(t)i
St − `t =
pistake(t)i
St − `t
αiWi(t)
St+1 − `t+1 −
pistake(t)i
St − `t
=
pistake(t)i
St − `t
(
αiWi(t)
St+1 − `t+1 − 1
)
(32)
Applying (11) at s = `t+1St+1 to (32) gives:
µstake(t)i =
pistake(t)i
St − `t
(
αiWi(t)
St+1 − `t+1 − 1
)
=
pistake(t)i
St − `t
(
αiWi(t)
St+1
1
1− `t+1St+1
− 1
)
<
pistake(t)i
St − `t
(
αiWi(t)
St+1
(
`t+1
St+1
(
1− δ
δ
)
+ 1
)
− 1
)
(33)
Recall that `t+1 = γt
∑n
i=1 βiWi(t) and that for positive functions f ≥ g, Pr[f < ] ≤ Pr[g < ]. Note that
pistake(t)i as adapted to a natural filtration Ft that is non-anticipating, by construction13. This means that
13As we sample the PoS algorithm and Markowitz weights randomly (and not psuedorandomly), there is no advantage to
looking into the future.
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we can compute probabilities conditional on Ft, e.g. Pr[`t|Ft] = `t, Using this and recalling that the money
supply St is a deterministic function yields:
Pr[|µstake(t)i| < |Ft] ≥ Pr
[∣∣∣∣pistake(t)iSt − `t
(
αiWi(t)
St+1
(
`t+1
St+1
(
1− δ
δ
)
+ 1
)
− 1
)∣∣∣∣ < 
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(34)
≥ Pr
[∣∣∣∣pistake(t)iSt − `t
(
αiWi(t)
St+1
(
`t+1
St+1
(
1− δ
δ
)))∣∣∣∣ < 
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1− e−
St+1
Wi(t) ) (35)
≥
(
1− e−St+1/Wi(t)
)
Pr
[
αi
n∑
i=1
βi < 
(
St − `t
Pi(t)
)(
St+1
γt
)(
δ
1− δ
)(
1
Wi(t)(maxiWi(t))
) ∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(36)
where (35) comes from splitting equation (34) into two terms by conditioning on A =
{
αiWi(t)
St+1
− 1 < 0
}
and Ac and throwing away the term dependent on Ac and the third inequality (36) comes from Wi(t) <
St+1 and majorizing the sum
∑
i βiWi(t). Note that (36) is the CDF for the product of an exponentially
distributed random variable α and an Erlang distributed random variable,
∑n
i=1 βi. Let A ∼ Exp(τstake) and
B ∼ Erlang(n, τlend). Then the product CDF14 is:
Pr[AB ≤ y] =
∫ ∞
0
τnstake
(n− 1)!x
n−1e−τlendxPr
[
A <
y
x
]
dx
= 1− τ
n
stake
(n− 1)!
∫ ∞
0
xn−1e−τstakex−τlend
y
x dx
= 1− τ
n
stake
(n− 1)!
∫ ∞
0
e−τstakex−τlend
y
x−(n−1) log xdx (37)
The integrand in (37) is maximized around the saddle point of the large deviation function Λ(x) = τstakex−
τlendy
x − (n − 1) log x. Let x∗ = arg max Λ(x). Using the first-order condition ∇Λ(x) = 0 and the quadratic
formula, we get:
x∗ =
n− 1
2τlend
(√
1 +
4τstakeτlendy
(n− 1)2 − 1
)
From Assumption 13, we know that 4τstakeτlend < (n−1)2, so x∗ ≈ 2τstakey. Applying the method of steepest
descent [20] to (37) implies that there exists C > 0 such that
∫∞
0
e−τstakex−τlend
y
x−(n−1) log xdx < Ce−Λ(x
∗) so
that we have:
Pr[AB ≤ y] ≥ 1− Cτ
n
stake
(n− 1)!e
−Λ(X∗) = 1− Cτ
n
stake
(n− 1)! (2τstakey)
n−1e−τ
2
stakey+
τlend
2τstake (38)
Combining (36) with (38) gives the result.
14Recall that the density of an exponential random variable with parameter α is αe−αx and the PDF of an Erlang distribution
with parameters n, λ is λ
n
(n−1)!x
n−1e−λx
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